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Abstract
Despite an abundance of policies being directed
towards them, users often struggle to follow good
cybersecurity practice.
Recognizing that such
behaviors do not come naturally, a logical approach is
to ensure that users are guided and supported in
knowing what to do and how to do it. Unfortunately,
such support is often lacking. The paper uses the
example of password authentication as a specific
context in which cybersecurity behavior is frequently
criticized, but where users are often left to manage
without sufficient support (as evidenced by examining
the lack of related guidance and enforcement of good
practice on leading websites). The discussion then
proceeds to look at the effect of actively supporting the
user, drawing upon the results from two experimental
studies (one looking at the practical impact of
guidance and feedback upon users’ password choices,
and the other examining the effect of gamifying the
password selection experience).
The results
collectively show that such efforts can have tangible
positive effects upon user behaviors. While the specific
findings are focused upon passwords, similar
principles could also be applied to other aspects of
user-facing security.

1. Introduction
Modern organizations are now characterized by a
fundamental dependence upon information technology
and knowledge management. This in turn introduces a
fundamental reliance upon cybersecurity in order to
ensure that related systems and data are available when
needed and protected from harm.
Unfortunately,
however, those using the systems are often poor at
cybersecurity, which tends to introduce resultant
challenges when they are nonetheless required to use it.

URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10125/59998
ISBN: 978-0-9981331-2-6
(CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)

Rawan Esmael
University of Plymouth, UK

The problem spans many domains, and even those
working directly in the field, in areas such as
information systems and knowledge management,
cannot be relied upon to have the necessary skills by
default [1]. As a result, we have environments which
are geared towards extensive knowledge sharing, but
with inadequate posture towards knowledge protection.
Indeed, while security and protection have long been
identified amongst the critical success factors for
knowledge management systems [2,3], little is often
done to position the people involved to become
compliant. This is not to say that technology is not
provided with the potential to enable security; it is
rather a case that those at the receiving end are often
not adequately equipped to use it. Similarly, policies
can be set that require security to be maintained, but
without a level of accompanying support this is less
likely to become a feature of actual practice.
Unfortunately, while there are some aspects of
information technology that users often appear to take
to without requiring much guidance, support, or
instruction (with the use of social media and mobile
apps being good examples), information security is
rarely amongst them. As a result, while users may still
be able to get by, doing so without suitable support
often means that they develop and adopt bad practice
in the process, which then becomes their default
behavior across in other contexts.
This paper presents evidence of the problems that
can result from a lack of security support and guidance,
and then proceeds to examine how changes in users’
awareness - and more particularly their resultant
practices - can be achieved if tangible attention is
directed towards assisting them (e.g. by providing
guidance and nudges towards appropriate, safer
behaviors). The problem of password usage is used as
a specific focus for the discussion, with evidence
drawn from a number of sources and experimental
studies to demonstrate both the current challenge and
the impact that more user-focused approaches may
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have. Section 2 presents some background to the
problem, looking at the weaknesses often seen in
password usage and examining some evidence of why
this may occur. Section 3 then proceeds to consider
the impact of a more user-focused approach,
examining the effect of supporting password use with
baseline guidance and feedback. Section 4 then goes
beyond this to examine how user awareness and
understanding can be further enhanced via
gamification of the security tasks that they otherwise
find challenging. The paper concludes with section 5,
which reflects upon the overall results and discusses
the wider implications of the findings.

2. Evidencing a lack of user support
If security and protection are critical success factors
for knowledge management systems, then in turn the
people involved are critical success factors for security.
Unfortunately, the two are not natural bedfellows and
users are regularly cited as a weak link in
cybersecurity, criticized for their lack of interest and
attention in terms of protecting systems, devices and
data. However, while users can certainly be held
accountable in some contexts (most notably if they are
actively ignoring clear advice), there are many
scenarios in which their behavior becomes easier to
explain if we look at the extent to which they have
been guided or supported to do things any differently.
To be clear on the definition here, guidance and
support does not mean simply setting a policy and
expecting users to follow it. What it actually refers to
is taking the time and effort to ensure that there is a
means for users to be made aware of what they are
supposed to do, ensure that they understand how to do
it, and ideally also appreciate why it is relevant, and
have an opportunity to be reminded of it at the relevant
time. Contrasting this to many so-called awarenessraising approaches (which often do little more than
circulate a document by email and expect it to be
adhered to), and there is often a gap to be bridged.
To consider a specific example as a basis for
discussion and evidence, we can look at passwordbased authentication. This is one of the most familiar
aspects of day-to-day cybersecurity, and it is directly
user-facing. Moreover, it is an aspect of security that
has been with us for years, and while our devices
(particularly smartphones) have now evolved to
incorporate alternative options such as biometrics,
passwords remain the dominant form of authentication
across organizational systems and online services (and
even the biometric-equipped devices still require
passwords or PINs to be in place as underlying fallback
methods). Thus, knowledge workers will not only be
routinely familiar with using them on a daily basis but

will typically have a multitude of devices and accounts
that require them.
In spite of all this, passwords are regularly cited as
a prime area in which users behave poorly and fail to
follow basic good practice, and related research can be
found dating back over many decades [4,5]. In more
recent years the problem has been regularly evidenced
by the widely-cited findings from SplashData, who
publish an annual list of the worst passwords [6].
Table 1 lists the top-ten most frequently encountered
passwords from the last three instances of their study,
and clearly shows that bad choices readily persist from
year to year with no obvious sign of improvement.
Similarly, other findings can be easily located
furthering highlight that – despite years of use as a
standard security feature – passwords continue to be
used badly [7]. As a result, they are estimated be
implicated in more than 80% of breaches and to incur a
significant management cost to organizations (with a
single password reset estimated to cost over £50) [8].
At the same time, they have proven to be form of
authentication this is difficult to replace, as no other
approaches offer ideal alternatives in terms of
usability, deployability and security [9].
Table 1. SplashData top-10 worst passwords
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

2016
123456
password
12345678
qwerty
12345
123456789
football
1234
1234567
baseball

2016

2017

123456
password
12345
12345678
football
qwerty
1234567890
1234567
princess
1234

123456
password
12345678
qwerty
12345
123456789
letmein
1234567
football
iloveyou

Of course, there is no shortage of guidance on how
to choose and use passwords more effectively, with an
example provided by [10]. A web search readily
reveals numerous examples, and many organizations
will themselves have taken the time to write password
policies and may even have taken some steps to
communicate them to staff. However, there is often a
mismatch between the existence of security policies
and guidance, and the effective provision and
promotion of it at the time that related decisions are
actually being made – which, in this case, refers to the
point at which users choose their passwords in practice.
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As a specific example, we can consider the results
of a recent assessment of the password guidance and
enforcement practices on a series of leading websites
[11]. This examined the extent to which the sites
provided users with password guidance at initial signup, as well as if they elected to change their password,
or indeed were forced to change it because the original
was forgotten. The assessment also considered the
extent to which any restrictions on password choices
were provided at the initial sign-up stage (recognizing
this as the most crucial point, given that after this the
users would have accounts – potentially holding further
personal details – and these passwords might be the
only things protecting them against impostor access).
The sites were selected from amongst the Alexa
global list of ‘The top 500 sites on the web’ (see
www.alexa.com/topsites), focusing upon the top ten
sites presented in English and with distinct password
processes (i.e. avoiding sites such as YouTube or
Google.co.in, which used the same approach as the
main Google site). The resulting sites and the key
findings are presented in Tables 2 and 3. The former
looks at the extent to which users were provided with
guidance or feedback at initial sign-up, and it can
clearly be seen that the majority of sites allowed users
to proceed without any upfront information. As such,
it would not be surprising to find users attempting to
use weak or otherwise ill-advised password choices,
which then places more emphasis on the ability of the
site to prevent such options from being accepted.
Table 2. Provision of password guidance and
meter at sign-up
Site
Amazon
Facebook
Google
Instagram
Microsoft Live
Netflix
Reddit
Twitter
Wikipedia
Yahoo!

Guidance

Meter

û
û
ü
û
û
û
û
û
û
û

û
û
û
û
û
û
ü
û
û
û

The fact that only one out ten of the sites offered
users interactive feedback on their choices via a
password meter (or strength ratings) was unexpected,
as earlier runs of the study had found this to be more
prominent. Indeed, the 2011 version of the assessment
had found seven out of ten sites to be using password
meters or ratings at the sign-up stage [12]. The

decrease in use is somewhat surprising, given that it is
not only serving to remove assistance, but also appears
to overlook the positive effects that appropriately
implemented meters have been found to deliver [13].
Meanwhile, Table 3 looks at the rules applied in
order to see if the site will accept a given password
choice. A total of six aspects were assessed:
•
•
•

•
•

•

Is a minimum password length enforced?
Does the site prevent the user from using their
surname as the password (if this information is
collected as part of registration)?
Does the site prevent the user ID (login name)
from being reused as the password (or the user
ID part of their email address, if this is used as
the login identity)?
Does the site prevent the use of ‘password’?
Does the site require users to use more than
one character type in the passwords (i.e. where
types are upper and lower case letters, numeric
characters and punctuation symbols)?
Does the site prevent the use of dictionary
words (with a series of test words being used
as candidates – including ‘diamonds’,
‘dictionary’ and ‘football’ – the latter two of
which were prominent in the SplashData lists,
alongside ‘letmein’ and ‘iloveyou’ which were
also tested as part of this criterion).

As can be seen from the table, the level of
enforcement is decidedly mixed, and various viable
tests are excluded by some sites. If an option is found
to be restricted, then at this point the user will get a
feedback message to tell them that their password
choice is not permitted. However, they notably have to
determine this through a process of gradual discovery
rather than having been advised upfront. In short, the
sites clearly have policies, but most do not elect to tell
the users what they are in a direct and upfront way.
Discovering things in a piecemeal manner is likely to
frustrate some users, especially if the feedback then
received is still not specific enough to help them
understand. Indeed, we can consider the following
examples of messages offered by the sites assessed:
•
•
•

Facebook – “Please choose a more secure
password”
Twitter – “Please enter a stronger password”
Yahoo – “Please create a stronger password,
the one that you submitted is too easy to guess”

Clearly the flaw in all three cases is that while they
are arguably attempting to nudge the user by informing
them that their current choice is not acceptable, the
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messages are giving no useful insight into what would
make it better. If users knew what ‘stronger’ and ‘more
secure’ looked like, then they arguably might have
avoided offering weak choices in the first place.
As mentioned above, this assessment of websites
was actually a repeat of a study that was first
conducted in 2007 [14], and half of the sites that were
included in the top-10 list then remained there in 2018.
However, in over a decade, there have been only
marginal improvements in the related password
practices, and even now only a small minority of the
leading sites (specifically Google, and arguably Yahoo
and Microsoft Live) are taking what could be seen as
comprehensive stance in terms of enforcing baseline
good practice. While Yahoo appears to accept shorter
passwords and is indicated as not enforcing
composition, there is actually a bit more too it in terms
of the passwords that will be accepted. Specifically, a
7-character password is only permitted if it includes all
four possible character types (i.e. upper and lower-case
letters, numeric and punctuation). If fewer character
types are used, then the password itself must be longer.
The most positive finding in the 2018 assessment
was that eight out of ten sites now offered some form
of additional login security, via two-step verification or
two-factor authentication options. However, while they
were available, these features were not enabled by
default and were not prominently promoted. Instead,
users typically had to go looking for them in their
account security settings rather than having the
opportunity highlighted to them.
A clear message arising from this assessment is
therefore that, although passwords are widelyrecognized as being used poorly, there is still a paucity
of support to encourage them to be used better – even
amongst the sites that others might regard as a

benchmark of standard/acceptable practice (e.g. other
providers looking to establish the authentication
provisions on their own systems or online services
might look at what these leading players are doing and
consider this to be a suitable standard to follow). Of
course, these sites may have various reasons for not
doing more. For example, they may consider that users
are not storing anything that warrants a greater level of
protection (although users themselves may disagree
with this, given that various personal and paymentrelated details can be held in several cases), or they
may not want to introduce anything that may act as an
impediment to getting users to sign-up. Indeed,
looking at later stages, such as password change and
(especially) reset, it is often apparent that several sites
do then provide significantly more information. In
addition, one other possible reason for not providing
guidance and feedback may be the belief that users will
ignore it anyway. Indeed, it may be reasoned that they
must surely be familiar with passwords by now, and so
telling them the rules again is hardly likely to have any
impact. In practice, however, this can be far from the
case, and the next sections proceed to examine the
differences that supporting the user can actually make.

3. Examining the effect of guidance and
feedback
As the website evaluation has consistently revealed
over the years, there is a frequent tendency to provide
users with security mechanisms, but then leave them to
fend for themselves rather than provide effective
guidance to support their use. This clearly increases
the potential for users to make poor and ill-informed
security decisions, which may actually increase risk.

Table 3. Password restriction applied at registration
Site

Amazon
Facebook
Google
Instagram
Microsoft Live
Netflix
Reddit
Twitter
Wikipedia
Yahoo!

Restrictions enforced at sign-up
Min. length
Prevents
Prevents
Prevents
Enforces
Prevents
(+max if stated)
Surname
User ID
‘password’
composition
dictionary
6
û
û
û
û
û
ü
ü
û
ü
6
ü
ü
ü
ü
ü
8
û
ü
ü
û
6
~
ü
ü
ü
8
~
û
û
û
û
4-60
û
û
û
û
6
û
û
ü
û
6
~
û
û
ü
ü
û
~
ü
ü
ü
û
ü
7
(ü = enforced; û = not enforced; ~ = partially enforced; - = item not collected by site)
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For example, poor decisions may result in users
being left under-protected or even exposed as a
consequence. The problem goes well beyond the realm
of authentication and passwords, but this context can
again be used to illustrate the positive effect of doing
things differently. Far from being the lost cause that
some may instinctively assume, user behavior is found
to have significant potential to improve.
As such, a more substantial study was conducted,
with the aim of enabling more conclusive
investigation, as well as exploring several parameters
of potential influence (as opposed to simply a contrast
between guided and unguided use).
In order to test the effect of guidance and feedback,
a practical experiment was conducted in which a group
of users were asked to perform a task involving
password selection, but with differing levels of
guidance and feedback to support them [16]. In order
to ensure that the experiment was realistic, the
participants were unaware that they were participating
in a password-related study. From their perspective the
primary task was to complete an online questionnaire
about social media practices, and the creation of a
password-based user account was an incidental activity
required as part of the process (note that ethical
approval was obtained in order to enable this mild
deception). A total of 300 users were involved in the
study, split into five equal-sized groups that then
received differing levels of support in selecting their
passwords. The characteristics in each case were as
follows:
•
•
•
•

•

Scenario 1: No guidance was provided, other
than a request not to re-use a password already
used on other systems.
Scenario 2: Basic password guidance was
provided alongside the password entry and
confirmation boxes (as shown in Figure 1).
Scenario 3: Basic guidance agsin, alongside
the provision of a traditional password meter
that rated choices as Weak, Medium or Strong.
Scenario 4: Basic guidance combined with
emoji-based feedback (a sad red-colored face
for weak choices, a yellow neutral face for
medium, and a smiling green face for stronglyrated choices).
Scenario 5: As for group 4, but with emojis
being accompanied by more emotive feedback
messages (“This is not good enough!”, “Ok,
but you can still do better!”, or “Well done!”)

In all cases, the password choices themselves
ultimately remained unrestricted – users could elect to
use a single character password, a dictionary word, or

anything else and the system would permit it. As such,
the end results observed in terms of password choices
were purely informed and differentiated on the basis of
the guidance and feedback provided. The passwords
themselves were all rated using the same scoring
algorithm [17] and categorized as weak, medium or
strong depending upon the score achieved. The
algorithm scores passwords out of 100, awarding five
points for each unique characters, two points for
another instance of a character already used, and 15
points for each new character type (e.g. uppercase,
lowercase, numeric or punctuation) after the type
initially used. Scoring boundaries were then defined as
weak for 40pts or less, 41-70pts for medium, and
above this for strong (noting that any long passwords
scoring over 100 were capped at that level). So, a
password such as ‘luke33’ would score 37pts and be
rated as weak, while ‘foL34p!’ (65pts) would be
medium, and ‘Lafe@9856!e’ (82pts) would be strong.
The results were then stored to enable comparison of
the performance across the different scenarios.

Figure 1. Baseline password selection
guidance offered to participants
The resultant findings are presented in Figure 2,
and the most striking aspect is the difference in the
proportion of weak-rated passwords between scenario
1 and all of the others. This clearly suggests that the
provision of guidance at the point of relevance can
make a tangible difference to user decisions, and (in
the case of passwords) shows that they do not have to
be forced into making stronger choices solely by
means of rules and restrictions. The more moderate
further differences that were then made via the various
feedback mechanisms (meter, emojis, messages)
suggests that such nudges can also deliver further
voluntary improvements.
One point that should be acknowledged here is that
the difference observed between the meter and emoji-
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based mechanisms may be as a result of the novelty
value of the latter approach (i.e. users may have
responded more to it because it was unusual, whereas
many participants would have been likely to have been
familiar with a traditional password meter approach
from their experiences in other systems). Nonetheless,
the findings as a whole clearly demonstrate positive
impact from any of the additional provisions, and so
the key lesson is that offering something can pay off.

Figure 2. Distribution of the password
strength ratings across five guidancefeedback scenarios

the use of gamification in mobile apps. A number of
game concepts have been designed [21], and amongst
those
taken
forward
for
proof-of-concept
implementation by the authors was a game entitled
Password Protector. This is intended to familiarize
users with applying good password practices, as well
as testing and developing their ability to generate and
remember strong password choices.
The game was developed using C# and the
Unity3D platform, and the basic premise is for players
to create and remember suitably strong passwords, but
working against the clock and with a restricted set of
character choices to work from. The main interface is
shown in Figure 3, and it can be seen that the player is
presented with a set of letters in the top right (which
can be alternated between upper and lower case using
the control to the left), plus a set of numeric and
punctuation characters (again, the onscreen interface
requires them to alternate between these in order to
both optimize the layout of the screen and also to
increase the challenge in completing the task within the
time limit). These characters are chosen at random for
each new game/level, thereby requiring the user to
make effective use of the characters available to them
(and preventing them from relying upon predetermined choices that they might otherwise plan to
use if they had a full character set available).

4. Gamification of security awareness
Beyond simply ensuring that guidance is provided,
another step is to try to make it more engaging, so that
it increases the chance of users (a) giving their
attention and (b) internalizing the message. To some
extent, this is what password meters already try to do,
as there is a basic form of interaction going on between
what the user chooses, what they receive as their
rating, and what they might then do to improve it.
However, taking this further, it is possible to explicitly
gamify the awareness process, presenting the lessons
and techniques in a context that engages users while
also helping them to acquire and practice key
knowledge and skills. The relevance and benefit of
gamification is recognized in many situations [18], but
its application is arguably well-suited to security given
that this is certainly an aspect that users do not tend to
enjoy by default and various examples of gamification
can already be found in the security domain,
addressing both the end-user audience and security
professionals [19,20]
To this end, a further experimental study examined
the potential to engage user interest in security – and
enhance resulting awareness and understanding – via

Figure 3. Password Protector game user
interface
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Table 4. Participants’ responses to password-related statements before and after use of
Password Protector
Statement
I understand the concept of password
strength
Increasing the length increases the
strength of the password
Use of different character types in my
password increases its strength
I can remember passwords of more than
8 characters
I find password meters useful in checking
if my password is strong or not

Pre-study
Post-study
Pre-study
Post-study
Pre-study
Post-study
Pre-study
Post-study
Pre-study
Post-study

The player has a time limit within which to make
their choice, and the available time decreases as the
game proceeds to later levels (e.g. at Level 1 the limit
is 90 seconds, then 70 at Level 2, 50 at Level 3, 40 at
Level 4). However, the time they take also affects the
time limit for re-entering the password a second time.
For example, if a user enters their initial choice within
15 seconds, they will have 20 seconds to enter their
verification attempt (i.e. the time they took to make the
initial choice, plus a slight additional margin to ensure
that they have some thinking time if required before
having to re-enter their choice). This again adds to the
challenge of the game, while at the same time aiming
to avoid the impression that the game is trying to
encourage choices to be made at speed. It also seeks
to dissuade players from rushing to create a password
without thinking about it, because they will still have
to be able to re-enter it within a similar timeframe.
Users’ choices are assessed in real time by a
password meter, which rates them on a 5-point scale
(Poor, Weak, Moderate, Good, Strong). Users must
offer a password that is at least rated Moderate, but
entering stronger choices increases the resulting score.
So, while successfully completing a level basically
requires users to choose, enter, remember and re-enter
a qualifying password within the time limit, they can
score differently according to the length and
complexity of the passwords they attempt. The
incentive to replay is therefore to go further and/or
better their earlier score, and in the process they will be
honing their password selection and memory abilities.
A practical evaluation was conducted that included
50 participants (34 male, 16 female), and involved the
app being made available to them to use over a twoweek period. Pre- and post-study surveys were then
used to assess their attitudes and awareness on either
side of the experience.

Strongly
Agree
18%
70%
30%
64%
38%
72%
12%
56%
16%
64%

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

16%
26%
18%
14%
14%
24%
20%
22%
22%
22%

20%
4%
14%
14%
20%
4%
22%
14%
34%
12%

14%
0%
18%
4%
0%
0%
24%
2%
12%
0%

Strongly
Disagree
32%
0%
20%
4%
16%
0%
22%
6%
16%
2%

The pre- and post-study surveys asked participants
to respond to a number of statements regarding their
understanding and use of passwords. The related
results are presented in Table 4, and it is very notable
that attitudes have become more positive as a result of
the exposure to the game. In most cases, the
statements were related to areas of understanding and
appreciation of password practice, but the 4th
statement, around remembering passwords, relates to
the participants’ perception of their own ability to do
perform the task, and it seems apparent that playing the
game has increased confidence in the ability to do
something that only a minority of users initially
believed they were able to do (indeed, prior to playing
the game, only a third believed that they could do it,
but this subsequently rose to over three quarters).
In addition to requesting responses to the
statements, the study also went beyond simply
assessing what the users claimed and also evaluated
their ability in practice. Specifically, a further task in
both the pre- and post-study surveys asked the
participants to provide an example of what they
considered to be a strong password. These attempts
were then evaluated by the research team, by feeding
them into the same password scoring algorithm as used
within the game. The notable finding here – and
perhaps the most significant finding from this phase of
the study – was that the average password strength
score rose from 59% in the pre-study surveys to 80%
in the post-study version. This suggests a genuine and
tangible increase in users’ understanding of what it
takes to create a stronger password.
It should be noted that the game is not attempting to
provide any evidence of the players’ ability to
remember and recall strong passwords in the longerterm. What it hopes to demonstrate to users is that
they are able to create and re-enter better passwords
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without requiring much additional time or effort. As
such, the intent (and apparent effect based on the
accompanying survey results) is to increase the user’s
confidence in their own ability to do this aspect of the
wider security task.
As an aside, it should be noted that users were also
asked to rate the game itself in terms of aspects such as
design, ease use, interest, and fun (all of which are
relevant if it is something the user is expected to enjoy
playing and to come back to, rather than be asked to
use but still regard as a chore). In these respects, the
results were significantly positive, with all users
indicating that the game was fun and provided an
interesting means to learn about this aspect of
cybersecurity.
The findings again contribute towards a wider view
that the users can - and will - do better with password
security if they are given a means of support to do so.
As mentioned above, Password Protector was just one
of several game concepts that were devised as part of
this particular project, and others targeted different
aspects of cybersecurity that have the potential to
affect the general user community. Indeed, another
game concept that was also implemented and evaluated
in the same manner was titled Malware Guardian,
which sought to increase players’ awareness of
malware threats by requiring them to act as the
defender of a target system (while also emphasizing
the importance of supporting actions such as system
updates and backup in ensuring their overall
protection). While a full examination of the related
results is outside the scope of the current paper, it can
be noted that this game was also met with a positive
evaluation. This again helps to support the case that
while passwords have been used as the specific focus
in the current discussion, the underlying points around
user awareness and support can be readily applied to
other aspects of cybersecurity as well.

5. Conclusions
User behavior is often the downfall of what might
otherwise be effective security mechanisms. However,
this does not necessarily mean that the users
themselves are at fault, as we cannot reasonably expect
them to manage knowledge systems securely if they
lack the knowledge of how to do so. It is not just a
question of instructing them or enforcing restrictions
upon them – the point is helping them to recognize and
understand the security issues form themselves.
Although setting and enforcing policy can have an
effect, and may even succeed in getting users to do
what is needed in a particular context, getting them to
understand things stands a better chance of achieving
acceptance and affecting their default behaviors (which

in turn has clear links back to established theories, such
as those relating to Reasoned Action [22] and Planned
Behaviour [23]). Of course, a lack of awareness or
understanding is not the barrier for all users; some
simply do not care enough and lack the incentive or
motivation to comply. However, while such users
clearly exist, it is reasonable to believe that they are in
the minority, and so the provision of appropriate
support is still a fair expectation for the remainder that
we have a chance of appealing to.
The password-related findings help to support these
beliefs. By default, systems and services often do very
little to present upfront guidance and support (even
though users may ultimately be prevented from doing
some of the wrong things via underlying restrictions).
As a result, we continue to see users gravitating
towards bad practice when the opportunity arises (as
illustrated by the SplashData findings). However, it
clearly does not have to be this way. The use of
password guidance and feedback had clear effects upon
the users within the experimental study, and a
significant proportion moved away from weak
passwords simply as a result of information being
provided to them. They still had the option to make
weak choices, but the provision of guidance and
nudges at the appropriate point (i.e. while they were
making the security decision concerned) had a positive
effect without resorting to any enforcement of rules
and restrictions. Similarly, the findings from the
Password Protector game suggested that if users are
shown the effects of different behaviors, they may be
inclined to choose the better ones. Moreover, the
experience of playing the game appeared to changed
users’ perceptions of what they could do (e.g. some
may previously have avoided choosing longer
passwords on the mistaken belief that they would not
remember them), and post-testing suggested that this
had actually changed behaviors. Given that the study
was not longitudinal, it could clearly be questioned
whether such changes might be transient, but the
collective findings suggest that, with appropriate
reminders and reinforcement, the effect could become
longer term.
For the avoidance of doubt, these findings should
not be mistaken for an argument towards maintaining
passwords over other forms of authentication.
Passwords themselves are still an inadequate and
unfriendly approach, and simply do not scale to the
number of systems that now expect us to use them. No
matter what guidance and nudges are given, most users
will find it impossible to choose strong passwords for
all the devices, sites and services that they use without
resorting to duplication and/or the use of some form of
password management solution. Moreover, there are
still going to be categories of attack against passwords
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(e.g. keylogging and backend breaches) in which the
strength will have no impact anyway, plus it has also
been argued that (past a certain point) pushing for
better password composition is not worth the additional
user effort required to achieve it [24]. However,
passwords continue to be used, and thus the point
remains that we could support people better in using
them.
In terms of how to take the lessons into practice,
the findings should not be regarded as a script that is
expected to be followed exactly. For example, it is not
proposed that all users should be required to play the
Password Protector before choosing passwords on
other systems – the point is rather that doing so has
been shown to have a positive impact, and so has likely
value within a wider arsenal of approaches to password
education (which would also include providing
guidance and feedback during actual password
selection). Indeed, no single technique is being
advocated as the answer in its own right, and overemphasis of any particular approach would in any case
be likely to lead to diminishing returns over time and
lead to the risk of user fatigue. The hope is to promote
understanding that judicious availability and usage of a
range of interventions has the likelihood of improving
matters over the typical level of success that has
traditionally been seen with passwords. Moreover,
even passwords are just being used as an example
context here; the wider point is that better
understanding, use and acceptance of security more
generally could be achieved by promoting it to users in
more effective ways.
The fact that users struggle with passwords and
would benefit from support in using them is not a new
finding. Indeed, [25] had flagged the need for
instruction, training and constructive online feedback
back in 1999. The disappointing fact is that we not
only seem no closer to addressing the situation with
passwords, but we now also suffer the same problems
with other forms of user-facing security as well.
Illustrative examples of further security tasks and
responsibilities that users might be encouraged to enact
better would include:
•
•
•
•
•

Anti-malware scanning and updating
Backup
Data leakage/loss prevention (including
avoidance of phishing and other forms of
social engineering)
Privacy management (relating to their own
data and that of the organization)
Vulnerability management (i.e. patching)

All of these represent contexts in which users are
again prone to making choices borne out of ignorance

or geared towards serving their own convenience, but
where their decisions might arguably change if they
were better informed. Added to this, there are many
cases in which knowledge workers are basically at the
mercy of technology provided, and so even if they
want to be security-conscious their efforts may be
frustrated by tools that are not sufficiently intuitive or
usable [26]. With all of these factors in play, it is
certainly not appropriate or fair to simply shrug and
blame the users for the situation. Only if reasonable
attempts have been made to guide and support them
can they be viewed as being at fault for the
cybersecurity issues that they may introduce. This in
turn links back into the overall provision of an
effective knowledge management structure [27], with
governance mechanisms being used to ensure that
policies and guidance are promoted to staff in an
appropriate manner.
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